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          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Must this Court decline to consider Brandon’s claim that the district court abused 
its discretion by failing to further sua sponte reduce his sentence upon relinquishing 
jurisdiction because Brandon did not seek reduction of his sentence below and the 




Brandon Has Failed To Argue, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Trial Court’s Decision 
To Not Further Sua Sponte Reduce His Sentence Upon Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
Constitutes Fundamental Error 
 
 Brandon pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  
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(R., pp.33-35, 101-04.)  Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction and sua sponte reduced Brandon’s sentence to a unified 
sentence of one and one-half years, with one year fixed.  (R., pp.132-36.)  Brandon filed 
a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., 
pp.137-39.)   
Brandon asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to further 
reduce his sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction, in light of his age, status as a first-
time felon, substance abuse, difficult childhood, and mental health issues.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.3-5.)  Brandon’s claim is not properly before this Court because Brandon never 
moved for a reduction of sentence below and the trial court’s failure to further sua sponte 
reduce Brandon’s sentence does not constitute fundamental error. 
It is well-settled that “Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 
961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125, 129 
(1995)); accord State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 173, 307 P.3d 187, 190 (2013).  An 
exception to this rule exists if the alleged error constitutes fundamental error.  Perry, 
150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976.  However, the burden of demonstrating fundamental 
error rests squarely with the defendant asserting the error for the first time on appeal.  
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  To carry that burden, a defendant claiming error for the first 
time on appeal must demonstrate the error he alleges “(1) violates one or more of [his] 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether 
the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.”  Perry, 150 
3 
 
Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980, quoted in Carter, 155 Idaho at 173, 307 P.3d at 190.  
While Idaho’s appellate courts have in the past considered claims raised for the first time 
on appeal that a trial court abused its discretion by not sua sponte reducing a sentence 
without requiring a showing of fundamental error,1 the Idaho Supreme Court has 
recently clarified that “all claims of unobjected-to error in criminal cases are now 
subject to the fundamental error test set forth in Perry.”  Carter, 155 Idaho at 173, 
307 P.3d at 190 (emphases added); see also Carter, 155 Idaho at 174, 307 P.3d at 191 
(holding “the fundamental error test is the proper standard for determining whether an 
appellate court may hear claims based upon unobjected-to error in all phases of 
criminal proceedings in the trial courts of this state”).  Additionally, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that Perry and Carter “apply to preclude an appeal challenging the trial 
court’s failure to sua sponte reduce a sentence upon relinquishment of jurisdiction or 
revocation of probation.”  State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 792, 331 P.3d 529, 534 (Ct. 
App. 2014). 
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case shows that 
Brandon waived appellate consideration of his claim that the trial court erred by not 
further sua sponte reducing his sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction.  Brandon did 
not file a Rule 35 motion for sentence reduction below and did not otherwise ask the 
sentencing court to consider further reducing his sentence upon relinquishing 
jurisdiction.  (See generally R.)  Nor has he argued on appeal that the sentencing court’s 
decision to not further sua sponte reduce his sentence constitutes fundamental error 
under the standards articulated in Perry, supra.  (See generally, Appellant’s brief, pp.3-
                                            
1 See, e.g., State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 233 P.3d 732 (Ct. App. 2010). 
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5.)  Even if he had, the claim would fail under the first prong of Perry, which requires 
Brandon to demonstrate a violation of one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights.  
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  Because the “right” to a sentence reduction 
stems from a rule of criminal procedure – I.C.R. 35 – and not from any constitutional 
provision, Brandon’s claim of error fails to satisfy even the threshold requirement for 
review under the fundamental error doctrine.  Clontz, 156 Idaho at 792, 331 P.3d. at 
534; compare Carter, 155 Idaho at 174, 307 P.3d at 191 (because claim that sentencing 
court erred by not sua sponte ordering psychological evaluation in compliance with I.C. 
§ 19-2522 asserted a statutory violation, not a violation of a constitutional right, the 
claim was not reviewable as fundamental error). 
Because the issue was not raised below, and because Brandon has not even 
asserted fundamental error, much less carried his burden of establishing it, this Court 
must decline to consider the merits of Brandon’s claim that the trial court abused its 






 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
relinquishing jurisdiction. 
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